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Abstract: The EBM+ programme is an attempt to improve the way in which present-
day evidence-based medicine (EBM) assesses causal claims: according to EBM+, mech-
anistic studies should be scrutinised alongside association studies. This paper addresses
two worries about EBM+: (i) that it is not feasible in practice, and (ii) that it is too
malleable, i.e., its results depend on subjective choices that need to be made in order
to implement the procedure. Several responses to these two worries are considered and
evaluated. The paper also discusses the question of whether we should have con￿dence
in medical interventions, in the light of Stegenga’s arguments for medical nihilism.
Keywords: Causality; Causation; EBM; EBM+; Russo-Williamson Thesis; RWT; Evi-
dential pluralism; Medical nihilism.
Resumen: El programaEBM+es un intento demejorar lamanera en la que lamedicina
basada en la evidencia (EBM) actual evalu´a enunciados causales: de acuerdo con EBM+,
hay que considerar estudiosmecanı´sticos junto con estudios asociativos. Este artı´culo aborda
dos problemas a los que se enfrenta EBM+: (i) que no es viable en la pra´ctica, y (ii) que es
demasiado maleable, i.e. sus resultados dependen de elecciones subjetivas necesarias para
implementar el procedimiento. Se examinan y evalu´an varias respuestas a estos problemas.
El artı´culo tambie´n discute la cuestio´n de si deberı´amos tener con￿anza en las interven-
ciones me´dicas, a la luz de los argumentos de Stegenga a favor del nihilismo me´dico.
Palabras clave: Causalidad; Causacio´n; EBM; EBM+; Tesis de Russo-Williamson;
RWT; Pluralismo evidencial; Nihilismo me´dico.
Short summary: The EBM+ programme is an attempt to improve the way in which
present-day evidence-basedmedicine (EBM) assesses causal claims. This paper addresses
two worries about EBM+: (i) that it is not feasible in practice, and (ii) that it is too
malleable, i.e., its results depend on subjective choices that need to be made in order to
implement the procedure.
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￿ EBM and EBM+
Causal claims are central to medicine. All areas of medicine seek to establish such claims:
in basic medical science, claims about disease progression and the maintenance of health; in
exposure assessment, claims about the e￿ects of exposure to chemicals or other agents; in in-
tervention assessment, claims about the e￿ects of health interventions, for example. The idea
underlying evidence-based medicine (EBM) is to make the evidence for these causal claims
explicit, and to make methods for evaluating that evidence explicit, in order to improve the
reliability of the assessment of causal claims:
Evidence basedmedicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of cur-
rent best evidence (Sackett et al., ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿).
However, the way EBM seeks to achieve this goal is by focussing on clinical studies—
particularly randomised controlled studies (RCTs)—and by excluding other kinds of evi-
dence or by viewing it as inherently low quality:
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical expe-
rience, and pathophysiologic rationale as su￿cient grounds for clinical decision
making and stresses the examinationof evidence fromclinical research. (Guyatt
et al., ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿￿)
The exclusionof ‘pathophysiologic rationale’—more generally, ofmechanistic evidence—
con￿ictswith a recent lineof researchon the epistemologyof causality. Russo andWilliamson
(￿￿￿￿) argued that to establish a causal claim in the health sciences one should look for evi-
dence of mechanisms as well as evidence of correlation. This is because there are many pos-
sible explanations of an observed correlation between variablesA andB: one such explana-
tion is thatA is a cause ofB, but others are reverse causation, confounding, chance, or other
relationships betweenA andB, such as semantic, constitutive, logical, physical and mathe-
matical relationships (Williamson, ￿￿￿￿a, §￿.￿). What is distinctive about the former, causal,
explanation is that there is some mechanism complex linkingA toB by which instances of
A explain instances ofB and which gives rise to the observed correlation. Hence evidence of
mechanisms is crucial to establishing causality.
Fig. ￿ provides a visual representation of this epistemology of causality. Association stud-
ies are studies which test for an association betweenA andB; these include both experimen-
tal and observational studies and encompass studies in clinical medicine as well as epidemi-
ological studies of disease, and systematic reviews and meta-analyses of such studies. Associ-
ation studies usually test whether A and B are probabilistically dependent, conditional on
other potential causes of B. Such studies provide direct evidence of a correlation via the
con￿rmatory channel C1. Within the class of association studies, RCTs are prized by pro-
ponents of present-day EBMbecause they can reduce the risk of confounding by unforeseen
causes ofB, so they can provide some indirect evidence of the existence of a mechanism of
action (C2). A more direct way of con￿rming the presence of a mechanism of action is by
con￿rming speci￿c mechanism hypotheses, which posit features of a possible mechanism
complex linking A and B (M2). Mechanistic studies test these hypotheses (M1). In some
cases, established speci￿cmechanismhypotheses can also con￿rmor undermine the presence
of a posited correlation (M3)—see Williamson (￿￿￿￿a, §￿.￿) on this point.
This approach, then, motivates the systematic evaluation of mechanistic studies along-
side association studies when assessing a causal claim in medicine. Parkkinen et al. (￿￿￿￿)
provide a set of general procedures for performing this evaluation and call this approach
‘EBM+’. Although EBM+ very much ￿ts the spirit of EBM, because it seeks to make evi-
dence and its evaluation explicit and systematic, it ￿ies in the face of the actual practice of
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Figure ￿: Evidential relationships for establishing a causal claim (Williamson, ￿￿￿￿).
present-day EBM, which, as we have seen, devalues mechanistic studies. Parkkinen et al.
(￿￿￿￿) view present-day EBM as a ￿rst approximation to correct evidence evaluation, with
the scrutiny of mechanistic studies a further step along the path—hence the ‘+’ in ‘EBM+’.
Note that EBM+ is intended to be applicable throughout medicine, which is broadly con-
strued to include the health sciences as well as clinical practice, because it is based on a general
thesis about how to establish causal claims. While Fig. ￿ depicts evidential relations when as-
sessing causation in a target population, the EBM+ programme also has a set of procedures
for assessing whether claims based on studies carried out on a di￿erent source population
can be extrapolated to the target population (Parkkinen et al., ￿￿￿￿).
The above view of the epistemology of causality has been the object of some controversy
in the literature (see Williamson, ￿￿￿￿a, §￿), and there are many who continue to agree with
Guyatt et al. (￿￿￿￿) that mechanistic evidence should be ‘de-emphasized’ or ignored. For ex-
ample, TheOxfordCentre for Evidence-BasedMedicine still (as of ￿￿￿￿) placesmechanism-
based reasoning at the bottom of its evidence hierarchy (OCEBMLevels of EvidenceWork-
ing Group, ￿￿￿￿), andMiriam Solomon holds that
Mechanistic reasoning (or “mechanistic evidence”) does not play a role in the
process of evaluating the e￿ectiveness of new interventions (Solomon, ￿￿￿￿,
p. ￿￿￿).
We will not revisit the rationale behind EBM+ in this paper, as it has been widely dis-
cussed elsewhere.￿ Insteadwewill focus on two new challenges for EBM+. Oneworry is that
the systematic consideration ofmechanistic studiesmay simply not be feasible—aworry that
we consider in §￿. Another concern is that EBM+may be prone to manipulation by subjec-
tive in￿uences, which we consider in §￿. Finally, in §￿, we discuss some consequences of our
￿ndings for Jacob Stegenga’s claim that one should have little con￿dence in the e￿ectiveness
of medical interventions.
￿See Williamson (￿￿￿￿a, §￿) for references. The EBM+ programme is very much in line with the e￿orts of
Cartwright and Hardie (￿￿￿￿) to improve evidence evaluation in evidence-based policy.
￿
￿ The feasibility of EBM+
Onequestion that immediately faces theEBM+programme is its feasibility. It is hard enough
to systematically assess association studies, which are well indexed in databases andwhich are
amenable to standardised statistical analysis. Mechanistic studies, however, are very hetero-
geneous and are not in general well indexed. Is it really practical to systematically evaluate
mechanistic studies alongside association studies?￿
The obvious way to meet this feasibility challenge is to provide a good example of evi-
dence assessment in medicine that appeals to EBM+ or something like it and that is clearly
feasible. In this section we shall investigate whether such an example is to be found and, if
so, where it is to be found.
Intervention assessment. It turns out that there are very few examples of the systematic
and explicit evaluation ofmechanistic evidencewhen assessing claims about the e￿ectiveness
of interventions.
Onepotential example is the umbrella review (i.e., reviewof systematic reviews andmeta-
analyses) of Posadzki et al. (￿￿￿￿), who assess e￿ects of melatonin on health. They consider
mechanistic evidence alongside association studies and formulate and evaluate speci￿cmech-
anism hypotheses. However, their review of mechanism hypotheses is limited to the goal of
identifying potential mechanisms of action; they do not integrate the conclusions of their
analysis of the mechanism hypotheses with the results of their analysis of association studies
in order to come up with an assessment of the causal claim based on all the evidence. Thus
this study cannot be said to implement theEBM+approach in its entirety. Nevertheless, they
show that it is feasible to perform a systematic review in order to identify a range of speci￿c
mechanism hypotheses, which is an important component of the EBM+ programme.
Anotherpotential example is the assessmentof apegylated combination therapyofpegin-
terferon alfa and ribavirin for the treatment of chronic Hepatitis C, which led to its recom-
mendation as the optimal treatment. Auker-Howlett andWilde (￿￿￿￿) show that the reason-
ing that justi￿ed this recommendation can only be understood by means of the conceptual
apparatus of Fig. ￿. This is because neither association studies on their own nor mechanistic
studies on their own provided grounds for the recommendation: only when association and
mechanistic studies are considered in combination with one another is the recommendation
warranted. While their argument is compelling, it shows only that one needs the concep-
tual apparatus of EBM+ in order to account for intervention assessment here—it does not
show that the detailed procedural recommendations of EBM+ are feasible. This is because
the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), who issued the recom-
mendation about the treatment, cited only association studies in support of their recommen-
dation (NICE, ￿￿￿￿), in accordance with EBM procedure but not with EBM+ procedure.￿
(Given the arguments of Auker-Howlett and Wilde (￿￿￿￿), the association studies on their
own should not have been taken to establish e￿ectiveness, and EBM+procedure would have
recommended a review of mechanistic studies on this occasion.) Thus, we must search else-
where for evidence of the feasibility of the full EBM+ programme.
Disease assessment. Mechanistic evidence is routinely considered in disease assessment:
there is often some integrationofmechanistic considerationswith the assessment of epidemi-
￿Howick (￿￿￿￿, §￿￿.￿), for example, expresses doubts about feasibility on the grounds that mechanistic evidence
is usually too incomplete, or the mechanisms themselves too complex, to be able to usefully consider mechanistic
evidence. La Caze (￿￿￿￿, §￿.￿) also presents a feasibility-related challenge, namely that of spelling out how evidence
of complex mechanisms can inform extrapolation inferences.
￿However, there may have been some undisclosed mechanistic reasoning. See §￿ on this point.
￿
Table ￿: The causal indicators of Hill (￿￿￿￿).
Strength Strength of the observed association
Consistency Consistency of the observed association
Speci￿city A narrowly de￿ned cause and e￿ect (disease), and the cause is not
associated with other diseases
Temporality The putative cause occurs before early stages of the disease
Biological
gradient
A dose-response curve
Plausibility Plausible given the biological knowledge of the day
Coherence No con￿ict with the known history and biology of the disease
Experiment Con￿rming experimental evidence
Analogy Similar e￿ects of similar causes
ological studies in order to obtain an overall assessment of a claim about disease causation.
However, this integration can be rather haphazard. To give an example, reviews that assessed
whether Zika virus causes birth defects considered mechanistic evidence in several di￿erent
ways (Williamson, ￿￿￿￿). Frank et al. (￿￿￿￿) used the well-knownHill indicators of causality
to assess teratogenicity (see Table ￿): these indicators include ‘Plausibility’ and ‘Coherence’
which assess ￿t of the causal claim tomechanistic considerations. Rasmussen et al. (￿￿￿￿), on
the other hand, used Shepard’s indicators, which are tailored speci￿cally to the assessment of
teratogenicity and which include a single indicator involving ￿t to established mechanisms.
Meanwhile Krauer et al. (￿￿￿￿) used an ad-hoc set of indicators, which included biological
plausibility. None of these systems speci￿es exactly how the various indicators combine and
di￿erent reviews came to di￿erent conclusions about teratogenicity. In sum, then, while
these reviews do support the claim that the routine assessment of mechanistic consideration
is feasible, they are far from exemplars of the full EBM+ programme, which seeks a more
systematic integration of evidence.
Exposure assessment. The assessment of the e￿ects of exposures provides a more fruit-
ful hunting ground for evidence of the feasibility of EBM+. In particular, the new (￿￿￿￿)
methods of the International Agency forResearch onCancer (IARC) for evaluating the car-
cinogenicity of various agents, presented in IARC (￿￿￿￿a) and Samet et al. (￿￿￿￿), are very
much in line with EBM+. Fig. ￿ provides an EBM+-style conceptualisation of the eviden-
tial relationships in IARC’s procedure. IARC separately assesses exposure studies, human
studies, animal studies andmechanistic studies and then integrates these assessments to come
upwith an overall evaluation of carcinogenicity. Human studies encompass epidemiological
studies on humans; these provide direct evidence of correlation and indirect evidence of the
existence of a mechanism of action, as portrayed in Fig. ￿. Similarly, mechanistic studies are
used to directly test speci￿c mechanism hypotheses: IARC have developed a list of ten key
characteristics of carcinogens and mechanistic studies are used to determine which of these
characteristics, if any, is present in mechanisms involving the agent in question. Addition-
ally, animal studies provide indirect evidence of both correlation andmechanism in humans,
as long as the relevant animal and human mechanisms are su￿ciently similar—a judgement
that is informed by mechanistic studies (Wilde and Parkkinen, ￿￿￿￿).
As a recent example of the procedural aspects of IARC evaluations, consider the evalua-
tion of the carcinogenicity of three chemicals, namely styrene, styrene-￿-￿-oxide and quino-
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Figure ￿: Evidential relationships for IARC’s evaluations (Williamson, ￿￿￿￿b).
lene, which tookplace on ￿￿–￿￿March ￿￿￿￿ andwhich culminated in themonograph IARC
(￿￿￿￿b). Including those responsible for the evaluation, members of IARCwho assisted the
evaluation, and invited specialists, the subgroup charged with analysing exposure data had
￿ members, the subgroup assessing human studies had ￿￿ members, that assessing animal
studies had ￿members, and that assessing mechanistic studies had ￿￿members. The size of
each subgroup re￿ects the range of expertise required for that component of the evaluation.
Before the evaluation meeting, roughly a year’s preparation went into organising the meet-
ing, selecting the studies for review, and producing an initial review of the material by the
working group members. At the review meeting itself, the subgroups met separately for the
￿rst four days in order to assess the evidence in their category for each of the three chemi-
cals. All subgroups then came together to integrate the individual assessments and generate
an overall evaluation of the carcinogenicity of each of the three chemicals—this phase of the
procedure took approximately three days. After the meeting, participants worked for over
a year to ￿nalise the resulting publication of the assessment, IARC (￿￿￿￿b). This gives an
indication of the scale of the enterprise. That it is feasible and reliable is witnessed by the fact
that IARC has conducted over a thousand evaluations to date, and that IARC evaluations
are relied on around the world to in￿uence public health policies that restrict exposure to
carcinogens.
That IARC evaluations are broadly in line with EBM+ procedure can also be seen with
the aid of Fig. ￿ and Fig. ￿, which characterise the EBM+ approach to evaluating e￿cacy
and external validity respectively. In the context of an IARC evaluation, the e￿cacy ques-
tion asks whether the agent under review is a cause of cancer in humans, while the external
validity question asks whether the conclusions from animal studies extrapolate to humans.
Consider Fig. ￿ ￿rst. If human studies su￿ce to establish or rule out carcinogenicity, then,
according to IARCprocedure, carcinogenicity is decided and the results of the assessment of
mechanistic studies donot bear on the overall evaluation. Otherwise, the IARCclassi￿cation
of carcinogenicity is in￿uenced by their assessment of speci￿c mechanistic hypotheses—the
￿￿ key characteristics of carcinogens—and their systemic review of mechanistic studies that
￿
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Figure ￿: EBM+ procedure for assessing e￿cacy (Parkkinen et al., ￿￿￿￿, §￿.￿).
￿
are relevant to these hypotheses. The subgroup responsible for assessing mechanistic studies
then assesses whether these characteristics are present and whether there is strong mechanis-
tic evidence overall, i.e., whether there is strong evidence arising frommechanistic studies for
the claim that there is a mechanism of action. Thus far, IARC procedure is perfectly in line
with EBM+. EBM+ then suggests that one should explicitly consider whether human and
animal studies provide strong indirect evidence that there is a mechanism of action, in order
to determine the status of the generalmechanistic claim, and that the status of the overall car-
cinogenicity claim tracks the status of whichever of the correlation andmechanism claims is
weaker. It is here that IARCprocedure departs slightly from that of EBM+ (Parkkinen et al.,
￿￿￿￿, Chapter ￿): IARC’s method for determining the overall evaluation is rather more in-
tricate, and, according to Williamson (￿￿￿￿b), has certain limitations. Despite these minor
di￿erences, IARC procedure is very close to that of EBM+. Fig. ￿ tells a similar story: for
IARC, the role of animal studies depends on how decisive they are in determining carcino-
genicity in the experimental animals and how similar the putative mechanisms of action are
in animals and humans, which is in accord with the EBM+ approach of Fig. ￿.
Overall, then, the feasibility of IARC procedure supports the feasibility of the EBM+
approach. IARC clearly show that it is possible to search for and assess mechanistic studies
in a systematic way, and to integrate this assessment with those of epidemiological studies
in humans and animal studies to determine an overall evaluation. All this requires e￿ort:
a working group tasked with assessing mechanistic evidence. But this e￿ort is proportion-
ate to that expended on the assessment of human and animal studies. Furthermore, EBM+
procedure imposes a lower burden than IARCprocedure, because EBM+recommends a full
evaluation ofmechanistic studies onlywhere association studies on their own fail to establish
causation (see Fig. ￿ and Fig. ￿), while IARC evaluate mechanistic studies even in situations
where this evaluation cannot in￿uence the overall assessment of carcinogenicity.
To summarise, evidence of the feasibility of EBM+ is hard to ￿nd in the areas of inter-
vention assessment and disease assessment, but there is good evidence arising from IARC
practice in exposure assessment. Although evidence of the feasibility of EBM+ is strongest
in the area of exposure assessment, the domain of application of EBM+ is not restricted to ex-
posure assessment. EBM+ o￿ers a general methodology for assessing causation in medicine,
and its feasibility for exposure assessment supports its feasibility for intervention assessment,
disease assessment, and indeed basic medical science.
While the number and quality of relevantmechanistic studies will vary from area to area,
IARC practice shows that, in an area where there are often very many relevant mechanistic
studies, it is feasible to search for and assess these studies, and to integrate that assessment
with assessments of other studies in order to determine the overall status of a causal claim of
interest.
That EBM+ is feasible in exposure assessment carries directly over to disease assessment.
Of course, diseases causedby infectious agents rather than chemical exposures require consid-
ering studies of mechanisms of infection and of the body’s defences against infection, rather
than studies of metabolism of chemicals and the e￿ects of resulting metabolites. However,
IARCalready routinely considers infectious causes of cancer, andnonew feasibility concerns
arise there.
Let us turn next to intervention assessment. Intervention assessment di￿ers from disease
assessment insofar as experimental studies become more practical when assessing the e￿ects
of an intervention. This complicates the evaluation of association studies. However, it does
not signi￿cantly complicate the evaluation of mechanistic studies. One will often need to
consider mechanisms of compliance with the intervention in addition to the mechanism of
￿
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Figure ￿: EBM+ procedure for assessing external validity (Parkkinen et al., ￿￿￿￿, §￿.￿).
￿
action of the intervention and any counteracting mechanisms. However, mechanisms of
compliance are analogous to mechanisms of exposure in exposure assessment, and these are
routinely considered in some detail by IARC, for example, so no new concerns about feasi-
bility emerge.
Thus the feasibility of IARC assessments supports the feasibility of EBM+ in both dis-
ease and intervention assessment, in addition to exposure assessment.
￿ The malleability of EBM+
Stegenga (￿￿￿￿) argues forcefully that the methods of present-day EBM are malleable, in the
sense that their implementation requiresmany subjective choices and thismakes their results
prone to in￿uence by interested parties. The worry arises that the methods of EBM+, which
require the assessment of mechanistic studies in addition to the assessment of association
studies mandated by EBM, will be even more malleable. If so, its malleability would be a
serious objection to EBM+.￿
Stegenga argues that themalleability of present-dayEBMstems froma range of problems
with association studies which leave them open to bias and fraud. The aim of this section is
not to defend EBM from these criticisms, but to investigate whether EBM+ is more or less
prone to malleability than EBM. Our approach will again to be to consider various possible
responses to this objection, in order to determine whether EBM+ can o￿er a viable defence.
Formalisation. One might attempt to respond to the malleability worry by developing a
formal framework for EBM+, in the hope that formalisation reduces the scope for subjec-
tive in￿uence. That this is not a promising strategy, however, can be seen from e￿orts to
formalise Hill’s indicators of causality, depicted in Table ￿. As we saw above, Hill’s approach
takes mechanistic considerations into account, but Hill does not specify exactly how to tell
when an indicator is present, nor how to integrate evidence arising frommultiple indicators
(Hill, ￿￿￿￿), leaving his approach open to the charge of malleability. There have been some
interesting attempts to formalise Hill’s approach in order to reduce malleability.
One line ofworkhere is theE-synthesis approachofLandes et al. (￿￿￿￿), which formalises
Hill’s indicators by means of the Bayesian network framework. Fig. ￿ represents the graph
of such a network. The node at the top refers to the causal hypothesis. At the next level
down there are variables related to Hill’s indicators:   refers to di￿erence making, PD to
probabilistic dependence, DR to dose-response relationship, RoG to rate of growth, M to
mechanisms, T to temporality, and so on. Each indicator is connected to an evidence report
(REP) variable for every item of evidence that bears on that indicator (although only one
such variable for each indicator is depicted in Fig. ￿). Each evidence report variable is in turn
connected to two further variables denoting the relevance, RLV, and reliability, REL, of that
evidence report. A Bayesian network also requires the probability distribution of each vari-
able conditional on its parent variables in the graph. These, according to Landes et al. (￿￿￿￿,
p. ￿￿), should be based on domain knowledge elicited from experts. It is here that the mal-
leability problem emerges. Domain knowledge is very unlikely to fully determine all these
probability parameters, and decisions will need to be made as to how to ￿ll in the gaps. Bias
and fraud can enter the picture here, and will be all the harder to detect because of the com-
plexity of the formal framework. One might attempt to elicit the probability distributions
￿Howick (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿), for example, expresses concerns aboutmalleability. He criticises EBM+ for not focussing
on the problem of ￿nancial biases, saying, ‘by ignoring the problem, they cannot possibly solve it.’ The extensive
literature on values in science reinforces concerns about malleability—see Douglas (￿￿￿￿); Teira and Reiss (￿￿￿￿);
Andreoletti and Teira (￿￿￿￿) andHolman (￿￿￿￿) for example. Gillies (￿￿￿￿a) responds toHolman’s concerns about
EBM+.
￿￿
Figure ￿: The Bayesian network formalisation of Hill’s indicators of Landes et al. (￿￿￿￿).
themselves from experts, but this is a big ask. Moreover, di￿erent experts are likely to provide
very di￿erent probability distributions, because experts have radically di￿ering views about
the relative importance of Hill’s indicators, and because many variables denote epistemolog-
ical qualities—reliability and relevance—which domain experts are not used to quantifying.
Hence, regardless of the merits of the E-synthesis approach, there remains plenty of scope
for subjective in￿uence and this approach is unlikely to help with the speci￿c problem of
malleability.
Swaen and van Amelsvoort (￿￿￿￿) also attempt to formalise Hill’s indicators in order
to reduce the in￿uence of subjectivity when deciding how the various indicators should
be weighed. They appeal to a ‘weight-of-evidence’ approach (Weed, ￿￿￿￿), which requires
quantifying the extent to which each of Hill’s indicators is met and quantifying the relative
importance of each indicator. Instead of eliciting these weights from experts, which would
be susceptible to the objections o￿ered above, Swaen and vanAmelsvoort (￿￿￿￿) try to learn
the parameters of the model from a dataset consisting of past IARC evaluations of the car-
cinogenicity of various exposures. The problem with this approach is that their assessment
of the extent to which past IARC classi￿cations exhibit each of Hill’s indicators is rather
arbitrary—certainly there is room for subjective disagreement there. Moreover, it is not clear
how the resultingmodel can be reliably extrapolated to future IARC classi￿cations, let alone
to the assessment of interventions. This is because certain model assumptions appear very
questionable: for example, it is assumed that weights of indicators combine linearly and do
not vary from context to context.
Thus formalisationo￿ers little scope for amelioratingmalleability. Whether one attempts
to elicit model parameters from experts or to learn them from data, subjective judgements
play an important role. Introducing strong model assumptions o￿ers one way of reducing
the number of free parameters that are open to subjective in￿uence. However, this tactic
merely threatens to trade malleability for unreliability, and in any case, model assumptions
are themselves open to disagreement.
Quantity of evidence. A more promising response to the malleability objection notes
that increasing the quantity of evidence tends to reduce subjective in￿uence. The general
￿￿
idea is that if evidence E makes some set CE of conclusions rationally permissible, where
di￿erent subjective choices along the way can lead to di￿erent conclusions, then additional
evidence F is likely to lead to a smaller, rather than larger, setCEF of rationally permissible
conclusions. In our context, the conclusions relate to a proposition of the formA is a cause
of B. If we takeE to be evidence from association studies andF evidence frommechanistic
studies, this phenomenon suggests that the in￿uence of subjectivity is likely to be reduced,
rather than increased, by taking mechanistic studies into account.
In a Bayesian framework, where CE might represent a set of rationally permissible de-
grees of belief in theproposition thatA is a cause ofB, this phenomenon is called the ‘washing-
out of priors’ and is made precise by means of a range of convergence-of-opinion theorems
(see, e.g., Dorling, ￿￿￿￿, §￿￿; Dorling and Edgington, ￿￿￿￿). Under certain conditions, one
can guarantee that a set of rational degrees of belief will converge to a single rational degree
of belief as the quantity of evidence increases. However, these conditions are somewhat ideal-
istic and there is room for debate about the extent towhich they aremet in practice (Earman,
￿￿￿￿, Chapter ￿). Moreover, even if they are met, they provide no guarantee that the in￿u-
ence of subjectivity will reduce in the short term. Indeed, there are many intriguing cases of
‘dilation’, where learning something new can enlarge the set of permissible degrees of belief.￿
Regardless of these challenges, there must be something of substance to the general phe-
nomenon, for otherwise there would be no advantage to gathering more evidence. The up-
shot is that one should expect EBM+ to reduce, rather than increase, malleability, in compar-
ison to EBM.To suggest otherwise would require some reason for thinking thatmechanistic
and association studies together are particularly likely to lead to dilation. However, the op-
posite appears to be the case, as we shall now see.
Variety of evidence. An even more promising response to the malleability objection ap-
peals to the potential for diverse evidence to reduce subjective in￿uence.￿ As noted above,
causal inference is beset by the problem that an observed correlation has a wide range of
potential explanations, including bias and confounding, and that one can only establish cau-
sation where these other potential explanations can be ruled out. Association studies can
provide some evidence against these alternative explanations. But, as Stegenga argues, asso-
ciation studies are prone to error and bias and aremalleable. The standard view is that where
the existing association studies are inconclusive,more association studies are called for. How-
ever, further association studies are prone to the same kinds of errors, biases andmalleability
as the original association studies. Just as independent witnesses are given more weight than
witnesses with common interests and similar ￿aws, studies with di￿erent designs and carried
out by teams with di￿erent interests would be more helpful.
Mechanistic studies are just such studies. Mechanistic studies tend to bemuchmore het-
erogeneous than association studies and typically involve methods other than those used by
association studies, such as in vitro lab work, biomedical imaging, autopsies, animal experi-
ments and simulations. Defects of these di￿erent kinds of study are independent of defects
of association studies and of each other. They are often conducted by research teams with
di￿erent interests to those who carry out association studies (which tend to be carried out
by drug companies seeking approval for lucrative new drugs). Thus publication bias, fraud,
and industry manipulation are less of a concern for mechanistic studies than for association
studies. To be sure, the teams carrying out mechanistic studies do have interests, but these
interests tend to di￿er.￿
￿See Zhang et al. (￿￿￿￿) for a recent discussion of the relation between dilation and disagreement.
￿Again, there are Bayesian explications of this phenomenon (e.g., Landes, ￿￿￿￿), but again, there are exceptions
to the general phenomenon.
￿This is of course not to say that interests never coincide, nor that bias, fraud and industry manipulation are
￿￿
To some extent, then, association studies and mechanistic studies act as independent
witnesses—certainly more so than do association studies and yet more association studies.
Scrutinising and evaluating both kinds of study can only help to diminish the scope of mal-
leability and error.
Reinforcing evidence. While the quantity- and variety-of-evidence responses go some
way towards addressing concerns aboutmalleability, more can be said. There is an important
sense inwhich association studies andmechanistic studies have complementary strengths. As
we have observed, association studies on their own can be unreliable indicators of causality
because of biases, unforeseen confounding etc. Mechanistic studies help to address precisely
these de￿ciencies: they tell us about potential confounders and help to determine whether
a correlation is genuinely causal. On the other hand, mechanistic studies on their own can
be unreliable indicators of causality in two ways: (i) it can be hard to determine from a com-
plex mechanism whether the putative cause actually makes a di￿erence to the putative e￿ect
(the ‘problemof complexity’); (ii) theremaybeunforeseen counteractingmechanismswhich
cancel out the in￿uence of some positive mechanism of action (the ‘problem of masking’).
Association studies ameliorate both these problems: (i) they can be used to demonstrate the
existence of a net association across the mechanism as a whole, showing that the cause does
make a di￿erence to the e￿ect; (ii) a positive association provides evidence that unforeseen
counteracting mechanisms do not fully cancel out the mechanism of action.
Thus association studies and mechanistic studies are not fully independent witnesses:
they are better than independent witnesses, because they make up for one another’s de￿-
ciencies. From an epistemological point of view, association studies and mechanistic studies
reinforce each other—their combined evidential value is more than the sum of the parts.
The case study of Auker-Howlett andWilde (￿￿￿￿), discussed above, shows this reinforcing
in action. This epistemological reinforcing can be expected to further reduce the in￿uence
of subjectivity.
Practice. So far, we have seen that formalisation o￿ers little scope for addressingmalleabil-
ity, but that we should nevertheless expect EBM+ to be less prone to malleability than EBM
because association and mechanistic studies o￿er a greater quantity and variety of evidence
and they reinforce one another. Actual practice supports this claim. Abdin et al. (￿￿￿￿) con-
sider evaluations of amoxicillin as a cause of drug reaction with eosinophilia and systemic
symptoms (DRESS). This is a case in which consideringmechanistic studies o￿ers to be par-
ticularly promising: there is too little evidence from association studies for an informative
EBM evaluation, because these adverse drug reactions are extremely rare and can take many
years to materialise. The authors apply both the EBM+ approach and the E-synthesis ap-
proach that we encountered above. They demonstrate inter-tool agreement: they show that
the two approaches yield similar conclusions, namely that mechanistic evidence lends fur-
ther support to the claim that amoxicillin is a cause of DRESS, but not enough support to
establish the claim.
We have already seen that IARC’s current approach to evaluation is very close to the
EBM+ approach. Anecdotally at least, there seems to be little inter-assessor variability in as-
sessments of mechanistic studies carried out by the mechanistic subgroup of an IARC eval-
uation. There is certainly no evidence that subjectivity has a signi￿cant in￿uence on overall
evaluations. Simple structural features of IARC’s methodology help to avoid malleability.
Firstly, potential ￿nancial con￿icts of interest are taken very seriously. (It sometimes hap-
never a concern formechanistic studies. See Fugh-Berman (￿￿￿￿); Green (￿￿￿￿) andConradi and Jo￿e (￿￿￿￿) on this
point.
￿￿
pens that an assessor is removed from a working group in the middle of a review meeting,
when a potential con￿ict of interest is found.) Second, scientists are not permitted to eval-
uate their own studies, so there is less scope for intellectual con￿icts of interest to in￿uence
proceedings. Third, the IARC secretariat work very hard to ensure consistency across eval-
uations, by ensuring that assessors are aware of normal standards by which judgements of
strength of evidence are made, and by adopting a very formulaic procedure for integrating
subgroup assessments in order to converge upon an overall assessment of carcinogenicity.
Malleability is kept in check in practice.￿
Malleability is an understandable worry, given problems faced by EBM in the assessment
of association studies. However, we have seen that there are several good reasons for think-
ing that a move to EBM+ will mitigate, rather than amplify, the e￿ects of subjective choices
during the assessment procedure.￿ While more clearly needs to be done to test for malleabil-
ity in EBM+, concerns about malleability are certainly not grounds for choosing EBM over
EBM+.
￿ Discussion
We have seen that EBM+ can be defended against two charges: that is it unfeasible and that
it is malleable.
While there is limited evidence of feasibility in the areas of intervention and disease as-
sessment, there is good evidence of feasibility arising from IARCpractice in exposure assess-
ment. Moreover, the feasibility of EBM+ in one area of practice supports its feasibility in
other areas: assessing causality is a general problem that transcends these rather arbitrary dis-
tinctions between kinds of practice. Indeed, the lessons learned here apply beyondmedicine.
For example, Shan and Williamson (￿￿￿￿) argue that the basic epistemological framework
underpinning EBM+, namely a particular form of epistemological pluralism, can also be ap-
plied to the social sciences, including to evidence-based policy (EBP), which leads to EBP+,
and to basic social sciences research, where the framework can be viewed as providing foun-
dations for mixed-methods research.
With regard to malleability, we have seen that there are general epistemological reasons
for thinking that subjective in￿uences are likely to be diminished by consideringmechanistic
studies alongside association studies, and that actual practice suggests that malleability is not
a substantial problem for EBM+. (Again, the general epistemological considerations carry
over to the social sciences.) This is not to suggest that EBM+ eradicates the need for per-
sonal judgement—judgements of quality of study, for example, are required by both EBM
and EBM+. The claim is that by considering mechanistic studies in addition to association
studies, one has more evidence to go on, more varied evidence, and evidence that makes up
for the de￿ciencies of other evidence, so there is less scope for any malleability with respect
to individual judgements to in￿uence the ￿nal assessment of causality.
Stegenga (￿￿￿￿) appeals to the malleability of EBM to argue for medical nihilism: the
claim that almost all medical interventions are ine￿ective. His argument can be put roughly
￿Far from being malleable, Williamson (￿￿￿￿b) argues that, if anything, IARC evaluations are not ￿exible
enough to cope with exceptional cases.
￿Recall that Howick (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿) criticises EBM+ for not focussing on the problem of ￿nancial biases. We
have seen above that the diversity of evidence considered by EBM+ helps to ameliorate this problem. Coupling
that progress with a healthy scepticism towards research carried out by researchers or organisations with potential
￿nancial con￿icts of interest, and a strategy for avoiding evidence appraisers with potential ￿nancial con￿icts of
interest, goes a long way towards solving the problem. Thus EBM+ is on a better footing than EBM with respect
to ￿nancial biases.
￿￿
as follows: medical interventions are approved on the basis of EBM assessments; EBM as-
sessments are riddled with problems, such as malleability, which weaken the link between
e￿ectiveness and approval; so we should have low con￿dence that an approved medical in-
tervention is e￿ective.
What should we make of Stegenga’s argument? At least two considerations urge cau-
tion. First, Stegenga appeals to Bayesianism to formalise his argument. Now, as we have
seen, Bayesian explications of scienti￿c con￿rmation are themselves prone to malleability:
one can easily take issue with Stegenga’s claims about the probabilities that feature in his ex-
plication and reach di￿erent conclusions, as Gillies (￿￿￿￿b) explains. Thus there is a sense in
which Stegenga’s focus on malleability is self-undermining.
Second, one can take issuewith the ￿rst premise of Stegenga’s argument: thatmedical in-
terventions are approved on the basis of EBM assessments. Certainly, intervention approval
panels almost always claim to come to their judgements bymeans of themethods of present-
day EBM. Certainly, the methods of present-day EBM—especially the assessment of RCTs
and meta-analyses and systematic reviews of RCTs—inform their judgements. But their
judgements tend not to wholly comply with the principles of present-day EBM. Typically,
analyses ofRCTs,meta-analyses and systematic reviews are presented to approval panels, and
then a general informal discussion ensues—which often encompassesmechanisms of action,
compliance and adverse e￿ects—before a judgement is made. Panel members give opinions
about the plausibility of the underlyingmechanisms, and this plausibility informs the result-
ing judgement about whether the intervention should be approved. This part of the process
does not accord with EBM, which, as we noted in §￿, holds that mechanistic reasoning and
expert opinion should be given little or no weight in comparison to RCTs. So the approval
process does not altogether follow the precepts of EBM.
That intervention approval departs from the precepts of EBMundermines Stegenga’s ar-
gument for medical nihilism. This is because the point of departure is with regard to mech-
anistic hypotheses, and this shifts the approval process in the direction of EBM+. That in
practice approval panels explicitly evaluate association studies and consider mechanistic hy-
potheses in an implicit, common-sensical way lends some con￿dence to the process, because
it is a step in the direction of EBM+. In order to cast doubt on the approval process, Stegenga
would need to undermine what takes place in practice, i.e., this common-sensical hybrid,
which we might call EBM±.
This is not to put the approval process beyond criticism. It would obviously be better
if, instead of an informal discussion of mechanisms guided by the expertise and interests of
the panelmembers who happen to be on the panel, mechanistic evidencewere systematically
scrutinised and its assessment systematically integrated with that of correlational evidence.
As we saw in §￿, the guiding principle underlying both EBM and EBM+ is that it is largely
by making the evidence and the appraisal process explicit and systematic that one can im-
prove the reliability of resulting judgements; there is clearlymuchmore to be done here with
respect to the practice of intervention approval.￿￿ However, the further one moves towards
EBM+, the more con￿dence one can have in judgements made on the basis of evidence ap-
praisals.
￿￿Moving further towards EBM+ requires some changes to the infrastructure of evidence evaluation, to ensure
that mechanistic evidence is systematically considered and integrated with evidence of correlation. But, as we have
seen in the case of IARC, this infrastructure is of the same kind as that required to evaluate association studies. See
Aronson et al. (￿￿￿￿, §￿￿) on this point, in relation to the assessment of mechanistic evidence for drug approval.
￿￿
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